"Depoliticizing Rebels: Government Use of Civilian Trials during Armed Conflict," with Justin Conrad and Cyanne Loyle. (Forthcoming at Conflict Management and Peace Science)
During armed conflict, incumbents predominantly use military courts to prosecute enemy combatants. However, in some cases, incumbents employ domestic civilian trials. Engaging the civilian judiciary to prosecute rebels is puzzling. Military courts offer unique benefits during armed conflict. For instance, the incumbent's military personnel conduct proceedings potentially mitigating some of the ambiguity over processes and outcomes inherent in using civilian courts. Under what conditions do incumbents turn to civilian courts during armed conflict? We argue that incumbents are more likely to prosecute rebels through civilian courts when rebels engage in criminal activities that resemble core governance functions, such as taxation. In these cases, incumbents take on the uncertainty of civilian trials when rebels present a governance \textit{threat} and when rebels commit crimes which offer the \textit{opportunity} to depoliticize and portray them as mere criminals through civilian courts. We find support for our argument using dyadic data on rebel and incumbent behavior during armed conflict (1990-2010). This study takes a first step at understanding why and how incumbents use domestic judicial mechanisms during armed conflict while building on our understanding of the interplay between war, criminality, and governance.
What is the relationship between natural resources and rebel governance? Previous studies have argued that resource rich groups have fewer incentives to provide social services. We argue, however, that even well-funded rebels may have incentives to provide some social services to civilians. Specifically, rebel groups profiting from the extraction of natural resources should be more likely to offer health care services as a means of ensuring a dependable civilian workforce than groups who do not profit from natural resources. Using data on both the extraction of natural resources and social service provision by rebel groups, we find strong empirical evidence to support our argument. We conclude with implications for scholars and policymakers.
Previous studies have highlighted that United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are effective at reducing violence during civil wars. But can these operations also change the incentives of the warring parties and lead them to pursue non-violent alternatives? This article provides the first direct test of UN peacekeeping troops’ effectiveness at inducing non-violent engagements, specifically negotiations during civil wars. Our analysis of disaggregated monthly data on peace operations, negotiations, and violence in African conflicts (1989–2009) reveals that sizable deployments of UN military troops, by themselves, are insufficient to foster negotiations, even when they reduce battlefield violence. Instead, the probability of negotiation instances is conditional on rebel tactics. We posit, when rebels engage in terrorism, peacekeeping troops can inadvertently alter the “power to hurt” of the belligerents in favor of rebel groups and create conditions conducive to negotiations. Our results have important implications for research on the effectiveness of both peacekeeping and terrorism and for policy-making.
UNDER REVIEW
"Justice and Militias during Civil War'' with Sosa, Santiago and Glayds Zubiria.
SELECTED WORKING PAPERS
"Two Sides of the Same Coin? Explaining Rebel Governance and Terrorism," with Sara M.T. Polo, Megan A. Stewart, and Jessica Maves Braithwaite.